Intelligence

By

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen (far left) talks in August 2008 with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, center, and then-Director General, Military Operations, Major Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha. Pasha now heads the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency.  AP/Navy

The U.S. decision to hush any advance knowledge to Pakistan about the raid that killed Osama bin Laden was no surprise to those who know the torturous history of Pakistan’s intelligence services.

A powerful segment of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus is made up of anti-U.S., anti-India conservative Islamic officers. In the past, they have recruited teenagers as fighters from extremist religious schools to fight in Afghanistan. And they have cut deals with “good Taliban,” to the fury of Americans.

For Islamabad, these Islamic alliances are strategic assets to keep at bay Indian influence over Kabul. And it is against a backdrop during which Pakistan and India have fought three wars since 1947.

The killing of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden last week in the vicinity of the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) has triggered new debate about the war against terrorism. An episode that has unduly embarrassed Pakistan has also put into question any future cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a relationship already marked by profound and mutual distrust.

U.S. officials, and even some Pakistani experts, believe that it’s virtually impossible that bin Laden could have lived for at least five years in Pakistan without constant covert backing of the intelligence apparatus. The ISI has a troubled history of complicity with various Islamist radical movements in Pakistan, including Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

War On Error

LONDON / WASHINGTON, June 12, 2002 — Even within the secretive world of private military companies, AirScan is noted for being unforthcoming about its operations. The Florida-based company has repeatedly refused to disclose what work it is doing in Europe, choosing instead to discuss the company's plans to track polar bears hibernating in the Arctic.

War On Error

LONDON, June 12, 2002 — The flaw in the U.S. communications system is a Pentagon network called the Global Broadcasting Service (GBS), a new military satellite system begun in 1996. The system was designed to "provide efficient, direct broadcast of digital multimedia information" and give "deployed warfighters...high-bandwidth data imagery and video of critical information." It uses commercial broadcast satellite technology. But it was not originally intended to use ordinary commercial TV satellites.

War On Error

LONDON, June 12, 2002 — If you heard anything, you would think it was a mosquito hovering, hunting for fresh prey. But in the dark night skies over the Balkan mountains, that distant, faint buzzing may mark a hunter of a different sort. Shrouded from view, loitering up to 16,000 feet in the air is a small army of robot spy planes used by Allied forces to watch for trouble. Every day, the spy planes are aloft to monitor the high mountain passes and deep valleys for illicit traffic, across routes in use for centuries to smuggle arms, drugs, even women destined for the sex business. In Afghanistan, some of the spy-in-the-sky observers can even be armed to fire missiles by remote control.

Inside this section